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ALL  CONVICT IONS ARE  NOT  THE  SAME:  
RETHINKING CUPE  ’S  ABUSE OF  PROCESS DOCTRINE  IN  CASES 
INVOLVING PLEA BARGAINS 
Lara Kinkartz* 
ABSTRACT 
Historically, when a criminal conviction was introduced as evidence of guilt 
in a subsequent civil action, the convicted party was permitted to introduce 
rebuttal evidence to negate or mitigate the effect of the prior conviction. 
However, the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2003 decision in Toronto (City) v 
Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) Local 79 has resulted in an unprece-
dented restriction on the ability to rebut a prior conviction. As a result of the 
CUPE decision, the doctrine of abuse of process now precludes rebuttal  
evidence in most cases.  
CUPE’s expanded abuse of process doctrine is troubling because, to 
date, courts have applied it to all prior convictions—even convictions arising 
out of plea bargains. However, Canada’s system of plea bargaining exerts  
significant coercive pressure on the accused, which may render such convic-
tions less trustworthy. This paper argues that it is time that our civil courts 
recognize that all convictions are not the same: those based on plea bargains 
raise unique fairness concerns that warrant relaxing CUPE’s rigid bar on  
rebuttal evidence. Judges in our civil courts ought to be permitted to examine 
the circumstances surrounding guilty pleas to determine if the plea bargain 
appears to be coercive. If so, they ought to permit the convicted party to  
adduce rebuttal evidence. Such an approach remains true to the main princi-
ple underlying the CUPE decision—the integrity of the justice system—while 
at the same time preventing the unfairness of coercive plea bargains from 
spilling over into our civil courts. 
Citation: (2014) 23 Dal J Leg Stud 22. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Criminal convictions often play a role in subsequent civil proceedings arising out of 
the same facts. Victims are unable to obtain damage awards through criminal trials and 
are therefore forced to bring civil actions to obtain recompense. Strategically, plaintiffs 
often commence these civil actions after the criminal trial has concluded so that they 
can introduce evidence of the defendant’s criminal conviction. Historically, the con-
victed party could generally adduce evidence to rebut the prior conviction.1 However, 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2003 decision in Toronto (City) v Canadian Union of Public 
Employees (CUPE) Local 792 has resulted in an unprecedented restriction on the ability to 
rebut a prior conviction: the abuse of process doctrine now precludes such evidence in 
most cases.  
Although CUPE involved a prior conviction arising out of a trial on the merits, 
courts have applied the decision more broadly. In the decade since CUPE was decided, 
courts have applied the abuse of process doctrine to preclude litigants from introducing 
evidence to contradict any prior conviction—even when the conviction was the result 
of a guilty plea.3 To date, there has been no discussion about the wisdom of treating 
convictions following trial and convictions resulting from guilty pleas the same way.  
Yet there are important reasons why these convictions should not be treated the 
same way. Most significantly, convictions following trials indicate that a criminal court 
has conducted a full factual analysis and is satisfied of the defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In contrast, there is only slight exploration of evidence in cases in-
volving guilty pleas. Although one might assume that the defendant’s guilty plea is 
conclusive evidence of guilt, such an assumption overlooks the fact that defendants may 
plead guilty for a variety of reasons, even if they did not commit the acts alleged against 
them. 
Importantly, many guilty pleas arise in the context of plea bargains. The contempo-
rary realities of plea bargaining provide strong incentives for criminal defendants to 
plead guilty, even when they may be innocent. Given this fact, many commentators and 
practitioners have criticized plea bargaining and its effect on our criminal justice system. 
However, there has been little examination of how plea bargaining affects our civil 
courts and their ability to provide justice to litigants. The reality is that criminal convic-
tions, including those arising out of plea bargains, often play an important role in civil 
actions that arise out of the same events. By applying the abuse of process doctrine to 
preclude litigants from rebutting a conviction based on a guilty plea, civil courts may 
unwittingly be working an injustice against defendants who have pleaded guilty.  
Given this reality, is it justifiable to continue to apply the same abuse of process 
framework to convictions following trial and convictions arising out of guilty pleas? In 
this paper, I argue that it is time for courts to recognize that all convictions are not the 
same: convictions based on plea bargains raise unique fairness concerns that merit re-
laxing CUPE’s bar on rebuttal evidence. To explore this argument, I first examine the 
evolution of judicial treatment of prior convictions in the pre-CUPE era and then turn 
to the ways in which CUPE changed this approach. Then, after discussing some of the 
                                                                                                                                            
1 See section II, below. 
2 Toronto (City) v Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, [2003] 3 SCR 77 [CUPE]. 
3 See section III, below. 
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dangers inherent in our system of plea bargaining, I examine the ways in which these 
dangers have manifested themselves in civil cases in which courts have prohibited the 
relitigation of prior convictions that arose out of plea bargains. Finally, I suggest that 
courts ought to be more willing to allow relitigation in such circumstances and, to this 
end, I propose a framework for courts to use in assessing whether a particular plea bar-
gain raises fairness concerns that warrant relitigation. In developing these arguments, I 
focus on the problems that plea bargains have created for our civil justice system; how-
ever, the very existence of these problems in our civil courts also raises serious 
questions about the integrity of our criminal justice system and the role that plea bar-
gaining has come to play in it. 
II. THE PRE-CUPE  ERA:  
THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL ATTITUDES TO PRIOR CONVICTIONS 
Despite significant changes in the treatment of criminal convictions during the pre-
CUPE era, the common law rules rendered it unnecessary for civil courts to consider 
whether criminal convictions based on guilty pleas were less trustworthy than convic-
tions following trial. Civil courts could almost always hear evidence about the 
circumstances surrounding a guilty plea and any inducements that were offered, mean-
ing that untrustworthy convictions were less likely to result in civil liability.  
The CUPE decision in 2003 marked a significant change to this approach and ren-
dered it extremely difficult for a convicted party to introduce evidence to rebut a prior 
conviction. In order to understand why the Supreme Court found it necessary to change 
the way in which civil courts deal with prior criminal convictions, it is necessary to  
examine the evolution of judicial approaches to this question prior to CUPE. 
A. Prior Convictions as Inadmissible Opinion: The Rule in Hollington v 
Hewthorn 
Traditionally, evidence that a party had previously been convicted of an offence 
arising out of the same facts was inadmissible in civil proceedings. Evidentiary weight 
was not an issue: the trier of fact was not permitted to hear evidence of the conviction 
at all. This approach originated in the 1943 English judgment Hollington v F Hewthorn & 
Co Ltd, which held that a prior conviction is inadmissible opinion evidence of the crimi-
nal court.4 The court adopted a rigid rule that was highly favourable to the convicted 
party but often created unjust results. As one Canadian commentator noted shortly after 
the Hollington decision: 
[T]he law particularly requires that in most cases a jury of twelve men should 
be convinced beyond reasonable doubt of the facts in issue. To state that a 
civilized community is willing to see a man hanged on such a finding of fact 
but to treat such finding as a mere [inadmissible] opinion in a subsequent 
                                                                                                                                            
4 Hollington v F Hewthorn & Co Ltd, [1943] KB 587 at 595 CA (Eng) [Hollington]. 
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case involving a matter of dollars and cents, is a reflection on the administra-
tion of justice, as well as an offence to common sense.5 
Although Hollington established a strict prohibition on the introduction of prior 
convictions, it made an important distinction between convictions and guilty pleas.6 
While the result of a trial could not be admitted, evidence of a guilty plea was a party 
admission that was admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule,7 just like any other 
statement made by the accused. This rationale for admitting guilty pleas meant that a 
person who had pleaded guilty was always permitted to rebut or contradict the prior 
plea. In this way, Hollington created a rule that made it very difficult to establish civil 
liability on the basis of criminal guilt. 
After some initial uncertainty about whether Hollington had been imported into 
Canada, most courts and law reform bodies accepted that Hollington was the law of Can-
ada and proceeded under the assumption that evidence of prior convictions was 
inadmissible.8 Hollington’s distinction between convictions and guilty pleas was also 
adopted in Canada, most notably in the Court of Appeal for Ontario’s decision in  
Re Charlton.9 As in Hollington, Canadian courts treated guilty pleas as “evidence of very 
great weight,” but permitted the party who had pleaded guilty to adduce rebuttal evi-
dence.10  
The rule in Hollington was problematic because it made it possible for a convicted 
party to avoid civil liability for his or her actions. The distinction between guilty pleas 
and convictions meant that unless a party had pleaded guilty, no direct evidence of 
criminal guilt could be introduced. This often resulted in the relitigation of the same 
issues at the subsequent civil trial. It was not long before courts began to challenge the 
rule in Hollington and to suggest that the treatment of prior convictions should be based 
on a more principled balance among the goals of fairness, finality, and efficiency.  
B. Moving Beyond Hollington v Hewthorn: the Admissibility of Prior  
Convictions 
The rule in Hollington soon attracted academic and judicial criticism owing to the 
absurdity occasioned by a rule that rendered convictions inadmissible. In England, the 
court’s rationales for excluding prior convictions were described as relying on “indefen-
                                                                                                                                            
5 CA Wright, “Case and Comment” (1943) 21 Can Bar Rev 653 at 658. 
6 Hollington, supra note 4 at 599-600. 
7 Note, however, that some argue party admissions are not hearsay at all. See e.g. R v Evans, [1993] 3 SCR 653, 
85 CCC (3d) 97, cited in R v WBC (2000), 142 CCC (3d) 490 at para 57, 130 OAC 1 (Ont CA) [WBC].  
8 See e.g. Clarke (Next friend of) v Holdsworth (1967), 62 WWR 1, [1967] BCJ No 2 (QL) (BCSC) [Clarke]; Ontar-
io Law Reform Commission, Report on the Law of Evidence (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 1976) at 
95 (stating that “[i]n Ontario, it is now generally accepted law that evidence of a criminal conviction is inad-
missible in subsequent civil proceedings to prove the facts upon which the conviction was based”). See also 
Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, The Report on Hollington v Hewthorn (Vancouver: Department of 
Attorney-General, 1977) at 6-7. 
9 Re Charlton, [1969] 1 OR 706, 3 DLR (3d) 623 (CA) [Charlton cited to OR]. The admissibility of a criminal 
conviction was not before the court in Re Charlton, so its references to Hollington’s distinction between guilty 
pleas and convictions were obiter. However, the treatment of guilty pleas outlined in Re Charlton was generally 
followed across Canada. See e.g. Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, ibid at 12. 
10 Charlton, supra note 9 at 709; Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, ibid at 12. 
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sible technicalities”11 and similarly in Canada, the rule was the subject of criticism by 
various law reform bodies.12 As a result, from the late 1960s until the mid-1980s, there 
were contradictory judgments from Canadian courts. Some felt they were bound by 
Hollington’s bar on the admission of convictions, but others strived to find a way to 
avoid applying this rigid rule.13  
Canadian legislatures soon took note of the widespread dissatisfaction with Holling-
ton. As a result, in the mid-1970s, Alberta and British Columbia amended their Evidence 
Acts to render convictions admissible.14 As amended, both statutes stated that convic-
tions were prima facie evidence of the commission of the offence and provided that the 
question of weight was a matter for the trier of fact. At least one case held that it was 
reversible error if a judge failed to direct the jurors that they must not treat the convic-
tion as conclusive proof, but rather determine its weight for themselves.15  
These statutory amendments reflected a principled balancing of the competing  
interests at stake when a party seeks to introduce a prior conviction in a civil action. 
Instead of the rigid focus on the technical evidentiary rules that was evident in Holling-
ton, these changes reflected an attempt to strike a balance among the goals of fairness, 
efficiency, and finality. This new treatment of previous convictions accorded substantial 
importance to finality and efficiency. At the same time, by treating convictions as prima 
facie proof instead of giving them conclusive weight, it allowed for fairness concerns to 
play a role. If the convicted party could adduce sufficient evidence to displace the great 
weight accorded to prior convictions, the prior conviction would not be determinative.  
Despite these changes, the treatment of prior convictions remained uncertain out-
side British Columbia and Alberta. However, in the mid-1980s, appellate courts began 
to follow suit. The landmark decision was Demeter v British Pacific Life Insurance Co.16 In 
Demeter, the plaintiff had previously been tried and convicted of murdering his wife. He 
subsequently brought an action against the deceased’s insurance companies, seeking to 
recover on her life insurance plan. Mr. Demeter’s pleadings expressly claimed that he 
had not killed his wife and, in defence, the insurance companies sought to introduce 
evidence of his prior conviction.  
                                                                                                                                            
11 C Tapper, Cross and Tapper on Evidence, 11th ed (London: Butterworths, 2007) at 118. 
12 See e.g. Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Report of the Federal/Provincial Task Force on Uniform Rules of 
Evidence (Toronto: Carswell, 1982) at c 15; Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report on Evidence (Ottawa: 
Information Canada, 1975); Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra note 8 at c 6; Alberta Institute of Law 
Research and Reform, The Rule in Hollington v Hewthorn, No 16 (Edmonton: The Institute, 1975); Law Reform 
Commission of British Columbia, supra note 8. 
13 See e.g. Clarke, supra note 8; Hellyer Farms Ltd v Biro, [1971] 2 OR 583, 18 DLR (3d) 527 (Co Ct). Clarke 
recognized that Hollington was the law of Canada; however, it stated that by virtue of British Columbia’s 
Evidence Act, convictions were admissible for the purposes of attacking credibility (although not for the pur-
pose of establishing guilt). Hellyer Farms went even farther and stated that by virtue of Ontario’s Evidence Act, 
convictions were admissible—and not just for the limited purpose of attacking credibility. 
14 In Alberta: The Alberta Evidence Act, RSA 1970, c 127, as amended by The Attorney General Statutes Amendment 
Act, 1976, SA 1976, c 57, s 1(2); in British Columbia: Evidence Act, RSBC 1960, c 134, as amended by Evidence 
Amendment Act 1977, SBC 1977, c 70, s 2. The modern version of these provisions are found in British Co-
lumbia Evidence Act, RSBC 1996, c 124, s 71; Alberta Evidence Act, RSA 2000, c A-18, s 26. There was one 
notable exception in both statutes: convictions for defamation were treated as conclusive proof of the of-
fence. For an explanation of this differing treatment, see Uniform Law Conference of Canada, supra note 12 at 
219. 
15 Tally v Klatt (1979), 17 AR 237, 106 DLR (3d) 33 (Alta CA). 
16 Demeter v British Pacific Life Insurance Co (1983), [1984] 43 OR (2d) 33, 150 DLR (3d) 249 (H Ct J) [Demeter H 
Ct J cited to OR], aff’d (1984), 48 OR (2d) 266, 13 DLR (4th) 318 (CA) [Demeter CA]. 
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The question as to the admissibility and weight of the prior conviction first came 
before Justice Osler in the Ontario High Court of Justice. After noting that Hollington 
had been vigorously criticized throughout the Commonwealth and was subsequently 
overturned in England, Justice Osler concluded that Hollington had not in fact been im-
ported into Canada. Examining various cases that were commonly cited as importing 
Hollington into Canada,17 he stated that their approval of Hollington’s bar on the admissi-
bility of prior convictions was only found in obiter comments. Therefore, Justice Osler 
felt that he was not bound by their approval of Hollington, and he admitted evidence of 
Mr. Demeter’s conviction. 
Justice Osler went on to rule that Mr. Demeter was attempting to bring a collateral 
attack on his prior conviction but that he had not revealed any evidence that would cast 
doubt on its propriety. In these circumstances, he concluded that it would be an abuse 
of process to allow Mr. Demeter to challenge his conviction: it was conclusive proof of 
guilt.18 The Court of Appeal subsequently upheld this decision.19 
Although Justice Osler’s conclusion that Hollington was never the law of Canada 
may have been overstating matters,20 Demeter finally brought certainty to the treatment 
of prior convictions: they were admissible as prima facie evidence of guilt and could be 
rebutted unless it would be an abuse of process to do so. While Demeter did not set out a 
guiding framework for this abuse of process doctrine, the Court of Appeal for Ontario 
did so the following year, in Del Core v Ontario College of Pharmacists.21 In Del Core, the 
defendant pharmacist had previously been convicted of defrauding a pharmaceutical 
company and was subsequently brought before a professional disciplinary body, at 
which time he sought to contest this conviction. The court followed Demeter and con-
cluded that evidence of the conviction was properly admitted.  
The court went on to discuss the abuse of process doctrine; however, there was no 
majority opinion in this issue. Justice Finlayson held that relitigating the issue of guilt 
was an impermissible collateral attack on the conviction. As such, he would have limited 
the pharmacist to calling “evidence in mitigation or by way of excuse for the offence.”22 
Justice Blair saw the issue differently. He held that it would be an abuse of process to 
relitigate precisely the same issues that had been decided at trial, as the pharmacist was 
attempting to do, and that in such cases, rebuttal evidence would be inadmissible.23 
However, Justice Blair emphasized that when a party was not seeking to relitigate the 
exact issue that was determined in a prior proceeding, he or she should be permitted to 
challenge the conviction directly or to mitigate its effect by introducing evidence of the 
circumstances surrounding the conviction.24 He went on to advocate a flexible approach 
to abuse of process and the ability to rebut prior convictions:  
                                                                                                                                            
17 Specifically, Justice Osler examined both the Supreme Court’s decision in English v Richmond, [1956] SCR 
383, 3 DLR (2d) 385 [Richmond], and the Court of Appeal for Ontario’s decision in Charlton, supra note 9—two 
cases that were often cited as importing Hollington into the law of Canada.  
18 Demeter H Ct J, supra note 16 at 50-51. 
19 Demeter CA, supra note 16. 
20 See e.g. the sources cited supra note 8, all concluding that Hollington was the law of Canada. 
21 Del Core v Ontario College of Pharmacists (1985), 51 OR (2d) 1, 19 DLR (4th) 68 (CA) [Del Core cited to OR]. 
22 Ibid at 9. 
23 Ibid at 22. 
24 Ibid at 21-22. 
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The law of Ontario is only now emerging from the long shadow cast over it 
by the decision in Hollington v Hewthorn…. It would be highly undesirable to 
replace this arbitrary rule by prescribing equally rigid rules to replace it. The 
law should remain flexible to permit its application to the varying circum-
stances of particular cases.25 
Justice Houlden dissented in the result, but, like Justice Blair, he advocated a flexi-
ble approach to abuse of process. He concluded that abuse of process only applied 
when the convicted party had initiated civil proceedings with the ulterior motive of 
challenging the outcome of the criminal trial, which was not the case in Del Core:  
With respect, I cannot agree with Finlayson J.A. that by insisting in his  
defence on having the substance of his misconduct retried, the respondent is 
initiating a collateral attack on a final decision of a criminal court of compe-
tent jurisdiction. If that proposition is correct, the Demeter case has brought 
about an astounding amalgamation of criminal and civil law which has here-
tofore been unknown in Canadian law.26  
Thus, both Justice Blair and Justice Houlden narrowly defined the circumstances in 
which abuse of process applied. They started from the proposition that criminal convic-
tions were admissible as prima facie evidence and that the convicted party was permitted 
to adduce rebuttal evidence. A court would only preclude rebuttal evidence in narrow 
circumstances amounting to an abuse of process.27 Therefore, an individual whose prior 
conviction arose out of questionable circumstances would be able to present this evi-
dence to the civil court, and the conviction would be less likely to serve as the basis for 
civil liability. In so holding, Justices Blair and Houlden set out a fairness-centred treat-
ment of prior convictions that judges could adapt to the particular facts before them. 
Following the Del Core decision, several cases adopted this approach to the admissibility 
and weight to be afforded to prior convictions.28 
Demeter and Del Core’s confirmation that prior convictions were admissible was an 
important correction to the rigid rule in Hollington. Significantly, the flexible approach to 
abuse of process outlined in Del Core meant that it was unnecessary for the civil courts 
to consider whether certain types of convictions (namely, convictions based on guilty 
pleas) were generally less trustworthy. The wide scope for adducing rebuttal evidence 
meant that, in most cases, convictions could be relitigated. This built-in safeguard meant 
that civil liability would be less likely to result from an untrustworthy conviction, regard-
less of any reliability concerns. 
While this flexible approach to abuse of process attempted to balance fairness 
against efficiency and finality, it nonetheless created problems. Because rebuttal evi-
dence was generally admissible, a civil court or tribunal could conclude that individuals 
were not guilty, notwithstanding that a criminal court found them guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. These contradictory results were blatantly incompatible, and suggested 
                                                                                                                                            
25 Ibid at 22. 
26 Ibid at 19. 
27 For other interpretations to this effect, see e.g. Taylor v Baribeau (1985), 51 OR (2d) 541 at 545, 548, 21 DLR 
(4th) 140 (H Ct J) [Baribeau]; Canada Post Corp v Canadian Union of Postal Workers (Leavere) (1998), 73 LAC (4th) 
129 at 141-44, [1998] CLAD No 406 (QL) (MG Picher) [Canada Post]; Tom Archibald, “Toronto (City) v CUPE, 
Local 79: The End of Relitigation?” (2005) 12 CLELJ 403 at 419. 
28 See e.g. Baribeau, supra note 27 at 545-51; Canada Post, supra note 27 at 143-46. 
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that perhaps a more restrained approach was necessary. Ultimately, these tensions with 
respect to the definition of abuse of process came to a head in the late 1990s, resulting 
in the Supreme Court’s reformulation of the doctrine in Toronto (City) v Canadian Union of 
Public Employees (CUPE) Local 79. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN CUPE  
& THE REFORMULATION OF THE ABUSE OF PROCESS DOCTRINE 
A. CUPE: The Importance of Finality for the Integrity of the Justice System 
The CUPE decision arose out of a trilogy of sexual assault cases between 1997 and 
1999 involving Ontario public sector employees.29 In all three cases, employees were 
convicted of work-related sexual assault and were subsequently discharged. In each case, 
the convicted employee subsequently brought a grievance for wrongful dismissal. The 
issue facing the arbitrator in each case was whether the criminal conviction was conclu-
sive, or whether it was merely prima facie evidence of guilt. The debate focused on 
section 22.1 of Ontario’s Evidence Act, which had been added to the statute in 1995. This 
section provides: 
22.1 (1) Proof that a person has been convicted or discharged anywhere in 
Canada of a crime is proof, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the crime 
was committed by the person…30 
This provision is essentially a codification of the principle outlined in Del Core: it 
renders convictions admissible, but allows the convicted party to adduce “evidence to 
the contrary” to rebut it.31 The problem is that the statute is silent on the circumstances 
in which the convicted party is permitted to adduce rebuttal evidence. In the sexual  
assault trilogy that gave rise to the CUPE decision, all three arbitrators refused to accept 
the prior conviction as conclusive proof and allowed the employees to adduce “evi-
dence to the contrary” under section 22.1. In two of the three cases,32 the arbitrators 
held that the grievor had successfully rebutted his conviction. As a result, the arbitrators 
upheld the grievances for wrongful dismissal.  
These decisions put the employers in the awkward position of being forced to re-
hire convicted sex offenders. Unsurprisingly, the employers brought an application for 
judicial review to the Divisional Court.33 The Divisional Court quashed the arbitrators’ 
                                                                                                                                            
29 The three cases were Toronto (City) v Canadian Union of Public Employees (Local 79) (1 December 1998), unre-
ported [CUPE arbitration]; Ontario (Minister of Community and Social Services) v Ontario Public Service Employees 
Union (White) (25 May 1999), unreported (Ont GSB) [White]; Ontario (Minister of Correctional Services) v Ontario 
Public Service Employees Union (Samaroo) (15 September 1998), unreported (Ont GSB) [Samaroo]. 
30 Ontario Evidence Act, RSO 1990, c E.23, s 22.1, as amended by SO 1995, c 6, s 6 [emphasis added]. 
31 CUPE, supra note 2 at para 20. 
32 CUPE arbitration, supra note 29; White, supra note 29. The third case was Samaroo, supra note 29. In Samaroo, 
the arbitrator issued an interim ruling that the conviction was prima facie, not conclusive, proof. This ruling was 
brought before the Divisional Court on judicial review before a final decision in the arbitration was rendered. 
33 Toronto (City) v Canadian Union of Public Employees (Local 79) (2000), 187 DLR (4th) 323, 134 OAC 48 (Div Ct). 
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decisions, and the Court of Appeal subsequently upheld this result.34 Although the two 
courts had slightly different reasons for reversing the arbitrators’ decisions,35 they both 
concluded that the convictions were final and binding.36 Despite the plain wording of 
section 22.1, they concluded that no “evidence to the contrary” could be adduced. 
This issue made its way to the Supreme Court of Canada in 2003, and the Court 
seized the opportunity to reformulate the abuse of process doctrine. The Court agreed 
with the widely accepted practice that “evidence to the contrary” could only be adduced 
if it would not be an abuse of process to do so. On its face, this seemed to affirm the 
principles in Del Core and Demeter. However, the point of departure from these previous 
decisions was the Court’s restrictive approach to abuse of process.  
In her majority judgment, Justice Arbour emphasized that abuse of process is pri-
marily concerned with the integrity of the justice system and not with the motives of the 
parties.37 As such, the focus must always be on whether relitigation would harm the 
integrity of the adjudicative process.38 This emphasis on the integrity of the justice sys-
tem was a response to the problems that arose out of Del Core’s flexible approach to 
abuse of process and, to this end, Justice Arbour indicated that there should be  
consistent verdicts between criminal and civil courts.39 Particularly since criminal con-
victions are based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, Justice Arbour stated that it 
would undermine the repute of the justice system if a civil court could hold that guilt 
was not even established on the balance of probabilities.  
In correcting this inconsistency, Justice Arbour’s judgment focused heavily on the 
importance of finality. She cautioned that relitigation raises three major concerns for the 
integrity of the justice system: 
First, there can be no assumption that relitigation will yield a more accurate 
result than the original proceeding. Second, if the same result is reached in 
the subsequent proceeding, the relitigation will prove to have been a waste of 
judicial resources as well as an unnecessary expense for the parties and possi-
bly an additional hardship for the witnesses. Finally, if the result in the 
subsequent proceeding is different from the conclusion reached in the first 
on the very same issue, the inconsistency, in and of itself, will undermine the 
                                                                                                                                            
34 Toronto (City) v Canadian Union of Public Employees (Local 79) (2001), 55 OR (3d) 541, 205 DLR (4th) 280 (CA) 
[CUPE CA cited to OR]; Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services) v Ontario Crown Employees Grievance 
Settlement Board), [2001] OJ No 3238 (QL) (CA). Note that at the Supreme Court level, the decisions in Samaroo 
and White were decided in a companion case to the main CUPE decision: see Ontario v Ontario Public Service 
Employees Union (OPSEU), 2003 SCC 64, [2003] 3 SCR 149. 
35 The Divisional Court held that the employee was attempting to bring an impermissible collateral attack on 
his conviction and that both issue estoppel and abuse of process precluded him from relitigating this issue. In 
the Court of Appeal, the court concluded that issue estoppel did not apply but that abuse of process preclud-
ed relitigation of the conviction: “finality concerns must be given paramountcy over CUPE’s claim to an 
entitlement to relitigate [the employee’s] culpability.” CUPE CA, supra note 34 at paras 102-108. 
36 Note that after the Court of Appeal heard this case but before it released its decision, the Ontario govern-
ment amended the Public Service Act, RSO 1990, c P-47. This amendment makes convictions conclusive proof 
of guilt in grievances before the Public Service Grievance Board, so long as the time for appeal has expired or 
the appeal has been dismissed. The Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act, SO 1993, c 38 was similarly 
amended with respect to arbitrations before the Grievance Settlement Board. 
37 CUPE, supra note 2 at para 43. 
38 Ibid at paras 45-49. 
39 Ibid at para 54. 
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credibility of the entire judicial process, thereby diminishing its authority, its 
credibility and its aim of finality.40 
Given these problems with relitigation, Justice Arbour emphasized that a litigant 
should only be permitted to challenge a prior conviction if it would enhance the integrity 
of the adjudicative process. She went on to outline situations in which relitigation may 
be permissible: (i) if the first proceeding was tainted by fraud or dishonesty; (ii) if fresh, 
new evidence, previously unavailable, conclusively impeaches the original result; or (iii) 
if fairness dictates that the original result should not be binding in the new context.41 
Although this list is non-exhaustive, it is a significant departure from the permissive, 
flexible approach to adducing rebuttal evidence set out in Del Core. 
Justice Arbour clarified circumstances in which fairness may require that a defend-
ant be allowed to call evidence to rebut his or her conviction: 
If, for instance, the stakes in the original proceeding were too minor to  
generate a full and robust response, while the subsequent stakes were consid-
erable, fairness would dictate that the administration of justice would be 
better served by permitting the second proceeding to go forward than by in-
sisting that finality should prevail. An inadequate incentive to defend, the 
discovery of new evidence in appropriate circumstances, or a tainted original 
process may all overcome the interest in maintaining the finality of the origi-
nal decision.42 
By articulating narrow exceptions under which relitigation is permissible, Justice 
Arbour’s judgment marked a significant change to the courts’ approach to abuse of pro-
cess by reversing the starting point for the analysis. Under the approach articulated by 
Justices Blair and Houlden in Del Core, courts began from the assumption that relitiga-
tion was permissible. Parties who wished to rely on a prior conviction as conclusive 
proof of guilt had to convince the trier of fact that relitigation would be an abuse of 
process; otherwise, the convicted party would be permitted to rebut his or her prior 
conviction. In contrast, the CUPE decision begins from the presumption that relitiga-
tion is abusive. Justice Arbour emphasized that “from the system’s point of view, 
relitigation carries serious detrimental effects and should be avoided unless the circum-
stances dictate that relitigation is in fact necessary to enhance the credibility and 
effectiveness of the adjudicative process as a whole.”43 Therefore, under CUPE, the 
burden has shifted to the convicted party to prove that relitigation would enhance the 
administration of justice.44 Otherwise, the conviction will be admitted as conclusive 
proof of guilt. This change has serious implications for convicted parties and renders it 
much more difficult for them to contest a prior conviction.  
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B. Judicial Interpretations of CUPE: Has the Corrective Gone Too Far? 
Owing to CUPE’s directive that challenging a prior conviction is presumptively 
abusive, relitigation has now become the exception rather than the rule. Since CUPE, 
the abuse of process doctrine has been applied with “surprising frequency” to preclude 
the relitigation of prior convictions.45 In most cases, not only are litigants precluded 
from contesting a prior conviction, but when abuse of process applies, they are also 
precluded from challenging the facts on which the conviction is based.46  
Despite CUPE’s strong caution against relitigation, one aspect of the decision 
seemed to leave room for courts to be slightly more generous in allowing relitigation: 
Justice Arbour’s statement that “fairness” may require relitigation in certain situations. 
This open-ended criterion suggested that there might be situations other than those 
discussed in CUPE in which relitigation is permissible. A few years after CUPE was 
decided, the Court of Appeal for Ontario considered this very question in Hanna v Ab-
bott.47 The court confirmed that the examples given by Justice Arbour were not an 
exhaustive list of situations in which relitigation might enhance the integrity of the jus-
tice system. It went on to conclude that “the doctrine of abuse of process ought to 
generally be a flexible doctrine whose aim is to protect litigants from abusive, vexatious 
or frivolous proceedings or otherwise prevent a miscarriage of justice. Its application 
will depend on the circumstances, facts and context of a given case.”48 As examples, the 
court stated that if the issues in the two proceedings are different or if there was unfair-
ness or a lack of effective representation in the prior proceedings, relitigation might be 
permissible.49 On its face, this language seemed to confirm that courts still had a fair 
degree of discretion in deciding what situations fell within Justice Arbour’s “fairness” 
requirement. However, subsequent decisions have not typically approached abuse of 
process in a flexible manner. 
Despite Hanna’s recognition that there may be justifications for relitigation apart 
from those explicitly discussed in CUPE, many cases have treated Justice Arbour’s three 
criteria as exhaustive. In several cases, the courts have held that because the convicted 
parties did not demonstrate that their case fell within one of the three exceptions set out 
in CUPE, abuse of process precluded them from adducing evidence to rebut their con-
victions.50 This rigid approach to abuse of process is a clear indication that, in the wake 
of CUPE, finality has supplanted fairness as the most important concern in the minds 
of the courts. 
Nowhere has this emphasis on finality been more evident than in courts’ treatment 
of convictions based on guilty pleas. Although Justice Arbour’s decision was rendered in 
the context of a conviction after a trial on the merits, courts and tribunals have since 
applied her abuse of process analysis to preclude relitigation of convictions based on 
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guilty pleas. As one administrative body explained, “[t]here is no indication in [CUPE] 
that the abuse of process doctrine applies only to convictions based on a full trial. The 
Court noted some exceptions to the applicability of that doctrine, but judicial determi-
nations based on plea bargains was not one of them.”51  
This development is an unprecedented restriction on the ability of a party to ex-
plain or mitigate a prior guilty plea. When convictions were inadmissible under 
Hollington, a party to a civil action could only be exposed to the inference that he or she 
was guilty of a crime if evidence of a prior guilty plea was introduced. Crucially, these 
guilty pleas were always open to rebuttal. Even when Demeter and Del Core rendered 
convictions admissible, the presumption in favour of relitigation meant that a convicted 
party was typically able to introduce rebuttal evidence and explain the guilty plea under-
lying his or her conviction. However, now that CUPE has severely restricted the possi-
bilities for relitigation, individuals who have pleaded guilty are far more likely to find 
themselves unable to explain the circumstances surrounding their guilty plea and to be 
found civilly liable as a result.  
In CUPE, the Court was faced with a conviction following trial, and therefore did 
not consider whether convictions based on guilty pleas present unique concerns. How-
ever, the modern reality of plea bargaining provides a strong inducement for accused 
persons to plead guilty. Under Hollington and later, under Demeter and Del Core, there was 
little need for civil courts to consider whether the dangers of plea bargaining had re-
sulted in an unreliable conviction: the ability to rebut guilty pleas and convictions 
provided built-in protection against these problems. It was therefore open to the con-
victed party to show that the inducement of the plea bargain was so strong that the 
veracity of the conviction was doubtful. Yet now that CUPE has removed this protec-
tion, there is reason to question whether it is justifiable to continue to treat convictions 
based on guilty pleas the same way as convictions following a trial. 
IV. COERCIVE JUSTICE: PLEA BARGAINING 
Convictions based on guilty pleas raise unique concerns that arise out of the prac-
tice of plea bargaining. Plea bargaining is “any agreement by the accused to plead guilty 
in return for the promise of some benefit.”52 This “bargain” may take many forms. To 
name but a few, it may involve a reduction in the charge, a withdrawal of certain  
charges, a promise not to proceed on certain charges, a promise to recommend a more 
lenient sentence, a promise to recommend a particular type of sentence (probation, fine, 
etc.), or a promise about the content of any submissions made to the sentencing judge 
(e.g. a promise not to mention aggravating facts).53 Plea bargaining has historically been 
criticized because it suggests that justice can be bartered; however, it is now an integral 
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part of Canada’s criminal justice system.54 Its pervasiveness is problematic because it 
represents an enormous coercive force on accused persons to plead guilty, regardless of 
their guilt or innocence. It is because of this potential for coercion that civil courts 
ought to consider whether there should be a wider scope for allowing rebuttal evidence 
in cases involving convictions based on guilty pleas. 
A. Why does Plea Bargaining Occur? 
Plea bargaining has existed for many years,55 and there are several justifications for 
its existence: it spares victims from testifying in court, it indicates remorse, and it pro-
vides quick and certain punishment.56 Yet these rationales are secondary to the main 
reason plea bargaining exists: as a practical matter, this practice is necessary for the 
proper functioning of the criminal justice system.57 
Criminal trials are lengthy and expensive and, in recent years, the costs have only 
increased. They require not only judicial resources and court time, but also countless 
hours of preparation by both the prosecution and the defence. Particularly in major 
metropolitan areas, a major part of a prosecutor’s job is efficient case management. The 
only way to handle the large number of cases passing through a prosecutor’s office is to 
resolve most of them before trial. 
In 1990, the Supreme Court’s decision in R v Askov made it clear that prompt dis-
position of cases is not merely a goal to strive for; it is a constitutional imperative.58 In 
Askov, the accused parties applied for a stay of proceedings on the basis that their Char-
ter right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated. The delay in Askov did 
not occur because of any impropriety on the part of the Crown; rather, it resulted from 
insufficient institutional resources to bring the matter to trial sooner. The Court ruled 
that a lack of institutional resources was no excuse for inordinate delay, and held that 
the proceedings should be stayed. Based on Askov, a significant number of criminal 
defendants were subsequently released because of undue delay in bringing their cases to 
trial. 
Askov sent a strong message that criminal cases must be moved through the system 
more quickly. The elimination of the backlog in the criminal courts hinges on the prose-
cutors’ ability to convince accused persons to plead guilty: there are simply not enough 
court resources to increase the number of trials. In this respect, plea bargaining is an 
invaluable tool in prosecutors’ arsenals because it allows them to present defendants 
                                                                                                                                            
54 Jeff Palmer, “Abolishing Plea Bargaining: An End to the Same Old Song and Dance” (1998-1999) 26:3 Am 
J Crim L 505 at 512. See also Gregory Lafontaine & Vincenzo Rondinelli, “Plea Bargaining and the Modern 
Criminal Defence Lawyer: Negotiating Guilt and the Economics of 21st Century Criminal Justice” (2005) 50 
Crim LQ 108 at 126. 
55 Ferguson & Roberts, supra note 53 at 500. For the history of plea bargaining in the American context, see 
George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2003). 
56 See e.g. Joseph Di Luca, “Expedient McJustice or Principled Alternative Dispute Resolution? A Review of 
Plea Bargaining in Canada” (2005) 50 Crim LQ 14 at 29, 31, 33, 61; Candace McCoy, “Plea Bargaining as 
Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea Bargaining Reform” (2005) 50 Crim LQ 67 at 80; Alan M Dershowitz, 
The Best Defence, (New York: Random House, 1982) at 131-32. 
57 Critics of plea bargaining dispute this rationale or argue that other changes could be made that would 
promote the efficient disposition of cases; however, necessity has long been the central justification for plea 
bargaining in Canada. See e.g. Ferguson & Roberts, supra note 53 at 533; Augustine Brannigan & JC Levy, 
“The Legal Framework of Plea Bargaining” (1983) 25 Can J Crim 399 at 402. 
58 R v Askov, [1990] 2 SCR 1199, 74 DLR (4th) 355. 
Vol. 23 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 35 
!
with significant inducements in exchange for foregoing their constitutional right to a 
trial. After Askov, this practice became an institutional strategy to relieve the strain on 
resources that had reached crisis levels.59 By the turn of the 21st century, only 8.7% of 
criminal cases in Ontario proceeded to trial60—a trial rate that was three times lower 
than the one recorded less than twenty years earlier.61 In no small part, this was due to 
the newfound importance placed on plea bargaining. The pressing need for early case 
resolution results in strong pressure on defendants to plead guilty and creates a real risk 
that innocent people will do so.  
B. The Dangers of Plea Bargaining 
The plea bargaining system is inherently coercive. This coercion exists because of 
the institutional pressures that necessitate plea bargaining and because of the strong 
inducements offered to defendants to encourage them to plead guilty. When these  
forces come together against a defendant awaiting trial, they result in powerful institu-
tional pressure—pressure that some defendants are unable to resist, regardless of their 
guilt or innocence.62 If civil courts use these convictions as the basis for liability without 
allowing the convicted party to explain why he or she decided to plead guilty, there is a 
risk of injustice occurring. 
While there are many inducements that may be present in a plea bargain, the most 
common is the prospect of a significantly shorter sentence. Although this sentence “dis-
count” varies according to the circumstances, a few Canadian cases have explicitly 
adopted the English rule that a guilty plea should attract a discount of one-quarter to 
one-third of the sentence.63 Importantly, the earlier the plea, the greater the discount 
typically is.64 This favourable treatment of early guilty pleas has led many commentators 
to argue that there is in fact a “trial penalty” (namely, a harsher sentence) that is levied 
against defendants who are “foolish or stubborn enough” to exercise their constitu-
tional right to a trial and are subsequently found guilty.65  
These pressures mean that plea bargaining encourages the innocent and guilty alike 
to plead guilty. Why might innocent parties plead guilty? First, there may be some in-
criminating evidence that makes them fear that they may nonetheless be convicted at 
trial. Second, defendants may have a prior criminal record that they fear may undermine 
an attempt to lead a defence. As the authors of a leading Canadian study on plea bar-
gaining conclude: 
By themselves, these factors can pressure an accused into foregoing a trial. 
But they may become pressures that are impossible to withstand in a plea 
bargain system, particularly where the bargain offered is large; in short, as the 
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concession or inducement increases, so also does the risk of causing an inno-
cent person to plead guilty.66 
This problem is compounded when one considers the situations in which prose-
cutors are more likely to offer generous plea bargains. Prosecutors bargain hardest and 
offer the greatest sentencing discounts when their case is weakest.67 As a result, a lead-
ing American study on plea bargaining concludes that “the greatest pressures to plead 
guilty are brought to bear on defendants who may be innocent.”68 For this reason, it is 
problematic if civil courts unquestioningly rely on convictions arising out of plea bar-
gains as conclusive proof of guilt, because these convictions may be less reliable than 
one might assume. 
There are many Canadian examples of innocent defendants who have accepted a 
plea bargain, only to be proven innocent many years later.69 For example, R v 
Hanemaayer70 involved a defendant who was charged with breaking and entering and 
assault. After hearing the Crown’s witnesses on the first day of trial, he entered a guilty 
plea because he “lost his nerve” when his lawyer informed him that the witnesses were 
convincing and that he would almost certainly be convicted and sentenced to a mini-
mum of six years in jail.71 He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two years less a day: 
one-third of the penalty he would likely have received if he had been convicted at trial. 
Nearly twenty years after he pleaded guilty, it was determined that someone else had 
committed the crime. Hanemaayer shows that even an innocent defendant may plead 
guilty if a cost-benefit analysis indicates that it is better to take the lighter punishment 
from pleading guilty instead of risking a conviction and the harsher sentence that will 
accompany it.  
The temptation of receiving a lighter sentence is compounded when a defendant is 
in pre-trial custody. Studies show that the longer defendants are held in pre-trial cus-
tody, the greater the likelihood that they will plead guilty.72 A stark illustration of this 
phenomenon was presented in a Life magazine article on plea bargaining in New York 
City: 
One defendant, in jail for ten months, was approached by his lawyer with the 
suggestion that he enter a guilty plea; he could probably get a one-year sen-
tence which, with credit for time served and good behaviour, would put him 
right out on the street. If he insisted on trial, on the other hand, he would 
have to spend a few more months in jail before he could get one, and would 
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get a stiff sentence as well if he lost. The poor defendant could hardly believe 
it: “You mean if I’m guilty I get out, but if I’m innocent I stay in jail?” But 
that’s the way the system works.73 
Although an extreme example, this description shows why innocent defendants 
may choose to plead guilty. By offering powerful inducements to plead guilty and harsh 
punishments for refusing to do so, the system of plea bargaining makes it costly to insist 
on one’s innocence.  
The problems resulting from the coercive nature of plea bargaining are com-
pounded by the weakened protections for defendants who plead guilty. True, a guilty 
plea must be voluntary in the sense that the accused must understand the nature of the 
charge and the consequences of pleading guilty.74 However, the plea bargaining system 
abandons the more robust safeguards of the trial process, including the presumption of 
innocence, the Crown’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to 
cross-examine witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination.75 In this way, plea 
bargaining permits the condemnation of the accused without a full analysis of the facts. 
Plea bargaining is central to the functioning of our criminal justice system because 
of its role in the efficient disposition of cases. However, the pressures involved in ob-
taining these guilty pleas and the relaxed safeguards surrounding them render these 
convictions inherently less trustworthy than convictions following trial. While these 
concerns raise obvious questions about the integrity of our criminal justice system, it 
must be recognized that they also have implications for our civil courts. By precluding 
defendants in subsequent civil actions from introducing evidence to explain their prior 
guilty pleas, our civil courts assume that the convictions resulting from these pleas are 
more reliable than they really are. In so doing, they may unknowingly be perpetuating 
the unfairness that can arise out of plea bargains. 
C. Subsequent Civil Cases Involving Convictions Based on Guilty Pleas 
Just as the plea bargaining system has gained prominence because of a need for ef-
ficiency, since CUPE, the relitigation of prior convictions has similarly been viewed 
through the lens of efficiency and finality. This efficiency-centred approach to the re-
litigation of prior convictions is problematic when the conviction is based on a guilty 
plea because CUPE’s definition of abuse of process provides little opportunity to con-
sider or counterbalance the coercive forces that induce some defendants to accept plea 
bargains. 
Although CUPE recognized that fairness might require relitigation in some situa-
tions, courts have not acknowledged that convictions arising out of plea bargains ought 
to fall into this category. In cases in which courts have allowed the relitigation of con-
victions arising out of guilty pleas, it has been because there are other factors in the case 
that fall within the criteria set out by Justice Arbour in CUPE.76 They have failed to 
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recognize that plea bargains may give rise to unfairness in and of themselves, and may 
therefore merit relitigation in many cases. Granted, permitting relitigation in these cases 
may raise other concerns, which are explored below in section V. However, as illus-
trated by post-CUPE cases involving convictions based on plea bargains, a greater 
unfairness may result if civil courts do not have a mechanism for examining the circum-
stances surrounding these convictions. 
The injustice that may result from courts’ failure to recognize the problems with 
plea bargaining was illustrated in Andreadis v Pinto.77 Andreadis arose out of a traffic acci-
dent between the plaintiff and the defendant’s ex-husband. The defendant, Ms. Pinto, 
was the owner of the vehicle and was charged with permitting a motor vehicle to be 
operated without insurance contrary to the Highway Traffic Act. She ultimately accepted a 
plea bargain: in exchange for pleading guilty, she received a $1,000 fine instead of the 
$5,000 fine that the Crown had originally sought. She was subsequently sued for dam-
ages arising out of the same motor vehicle accident. 
Ms. Pinto argued that she should be allowed to relitigate her conviction because of 
fairness concerns. Among other arguments, she contended that the civil action had sig-
nificantly higher stakes because it exposed her to a potential $30,000 judgment. 
However, the trial judge had little sympathy for this argument. Citing CUPE, he stated 
that lower stakes in the Highway Traffic Act prosecution were only relevant if they meant 
that Ms. Pinto had not been motivated to produce a “full and robust response.”78 At the 
time of the Highway Traffic Act charge, Ms. Pinto had indicated that she could not even 
afford to pay $1,000, let alone $5,000. Therefore, the trial judge concluded that she had 
been motivated to produce a full and robust response, and that the abuse of process 
doctrine precluded relitigation. 
The analysis in Andreadis illustrates the problem with focusing on the stakes in the 
two proceedings instead of on the problems with plea bargaining itself. Given the finan-
cial strains Ms. Pinto was facing, a $1,000 fine likely seemed much less daunting than a 
$5,000 fine, even if she did not have the money available at the time. Given these facts, 
it is understandable why Ms. Pinto pleaded guilty: the plea bargain saved her a signifi-
cant amount of money at a time when she had no money to spare. However, had she 
known that accepting the plea bargain would expose her to potential liability for 
$30,000, she might have decided to contest the charges and go to trial. 
Ms. Pinto’s case is also troubling because of the way the court dealt with inconsist-
encies in her evidence. During a motion before the trial judge, Ms. Pinto testified that 
she had not given her ex-husband permission to use the vehicle at the time of the acci-
dent.79 This assertion was inconsistent with the statement of facts that supported her 
guilty plea. If the trial judge had been alive to the pressures that induced Ms. Pinto to 
plead guilty—namely, her strained financial resources and the plea bargain that offered 
her an 80% reduction in the fine—he may have concluded that this was a potentially 
innocent defendant who had succumbed to the pressure to plead guilty. Instead, the 
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trial judge concluded that the inconsistencies in her testimony rendered her credibility 
suspect.80 While his conclusion was a reasonable one, there was an equally reasonable 
alternative that he failed to consider: he did not recognize that Ms. Pinto’s contradictory 
evidence may have been an indication that her conviction was unreliable and that she 
had been induced to plead guilty by the extremely favourable deal offered by the Crown. 
By analyzing the evidence from a perspective that privileged efficiency and finality, the 
trial judge failed to turn his mind to the coercive nature of plea bargaining and to recog-
nize that it may be creating unfairness in the case before him. 
Andreadis v Pinto is not an isolated case illustrating the courts’ failure to recognize 
the problems with plea bargaining. Calgary (City) v CPA81 also illustrates the potential 
unfairness that can result when courts focus on efficiency instead of examining the im-
plications of plea bargaining. In CPA, a police officer was charged criminally after his 
service revolver was stolen from his personal vehicle. The officer, Detective Madison, 
was charged with careless use of a firearm and contravention of firearm storage regula-
tions. These charges exposed him to the prospect of both a criminal conviction and a 
firearms prohibition, which would have ended his career as a police officer.82 Ultimately, 
he accepted a plea bargain: he pleaded guilty to one charge, the other charge was with-
drawn, and he was granted an absolute discharge.  
The charge to which Detective Madison pleaded guilty only applied to police offic-
ers who were off duty. When he subsequently sought indemnification for his legal 
defence, the City of Calgary refused: his collective agreement only provided indemnifi-
cation if the legal action was related to an incident that occurred while he was engaged 
in his duties as a police officer.83 Detective Madison then brought a grievance against 
the City and, as part of that proceeding, sought to introduce evidence that would show 
he was engaged in his duties at the time of the incident. Because this evidence would 
contradict the basis for his guilty plea, the CUPE abuse of process analysis was applica-
ble to the case. 
The arbitration board held that his guilty plea was “no less a judicial determination” 
than a conviction following trial84 and that he had failed to bring himself within any of 
the exceptions outlined in CUPE: 
We cannot find that the grievor’s reasons for pleading guilty fall within the 
exceptions expressed in paragraph 53 of Toronto [CUPE]. Indeed the reverse 
is true for one of the exceptions; rather than being inconsequential, the 
stakes were too serious to generate a full and robust response; that is, the 
grievor was not prepared to risk mounting a defence for fear of prejudicing 
his hope for a discharge.85 
Ironically, in this statement, the board alluded to the strong inducements offered by 
the plea bargain but failed to recognize that this “bargain” was coercive. The board con-
firmed that the benefits of pleading guilty were so strong that the only rational decision 
was to accept the plea bargain, yet it did not consider the implications of this conclu-
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81 CPA, supra note 50. 
82 Ibid at 391. 
83 Ibid at 388. 
84 Ibid at 399. 
85 Ibid [emphasis in original]. 
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sion. Accepting the plea bargain was the only way Detective Madison could ensure that 
he would not lose his job. The veracity of his admission that he was off duty at the time 
of the incident is questionable when viewed in light of these circumstances. 
The board concluded that CUPE clearly precluded relitigation of Detective Madi-
son’s guilty plea if the definition of “engaged in his/her duties” was the same in the 
criminal offence and his collective agreement.86 Ultimately, relitigation was permitted 
because the board concluded that the definition in the indemnity clause was broader 
than the definition in the criminal offence. The facts underlying his conviction were 
therefore still consistent with an assertion that, as defined in the collective agreement, he was 
engaged in the scope of his duties at the time.87  
Nonetheless, this case illustrates the problem with applying CUPE’s abuse of pro-
cess analysis to convictions based on guilty pleas. As in CPA, when a criminal 
defendant’s livelihood is at stake and he is offered a chance to avoid punishment and 
save his career, it is understandable why he may choose to plead guilty. Yet these in-
ducements call into question whether he is truly guilty and whether the facts supporting 
the guilty plea are accurate. CPA suggests that, in such cases, it may better serve the 
truth-seeking function of trials to consider allowing the defendant to introduce rebuttal 
evidence. Unfortunately, under the current interpretation of CUPE, courts are unlikely 
to allow defendants to do so.  
CUPE made it clear that the abuse of process analysis should always be conducted 
with the aim of enhancing the integrity of the justice system, yet courts have not paused 
to consider whether plea bargaining undermines this goal. A few cases have allowed 
relitigation of convictions involving guilty pleas because of higher stakes in the civil 
proceeding and, in so doing, have made passing reference to the presence of a plea 
bargain. Yet none of these cases have recognized that the plea bargain itself is a problem 
that engages fairness concerns.88 Both Andreadis and CPA illustrate that the dangers that 
arise from the coercive nature of plea bargaining are more than theoretical criticisms; 
they are borne out in reality. In order to enhance the integrity of the justice system, civil 
courts ought to recognize this danger and attempt to address it through their approach 
to abuse of process. 
V. THE CASE FOR RELITIGATING CONVICTIONS BASED ON PLEA BARGAINS  
A. Relitigating Convictions based on Plea Bargains and the Integrity of the 
Justice System 
To be clear, any conviction—including a conviction based on a plea bargain—
should be treated as evidence of great weight in subsequent proceedings. However, the 
differences between convictions based on plea bargains and convictions following trial 
suggest that courts ought to be more sensitive to the particular concerns raised by plea 
bargaining and that they should more readily permit relitigation of such convictions. 
                                                                                                                                            
86 Ibid at 422. 
87 Ibid at 422-23. 
88 See e.g. the cases discussed above at note 76. See also Watteel v Lacaille, 167 ACWS (3d) 504, [2008] OJ No 
1821 (QL) (Ont Sup Ct J). 
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Convictions based on plea bargains should be seen as a “fairness” concern (to adopt the 
words of CUPE)—one that requires civil judges to examine the surrounding circum-
stances when a convicted party wishes to introduce rebuttal evidence. As with other 
fairness concerns that may suggest relitigation is required, this case-by-case analysis 
permits courts to limit rebuttal evidence to situations in which there is truly a question 
about the veracity of the conviction. I discuss a potential framework for this examina-
tion below. While this inquiry would admittedly be a departure from the restrictive  
approach to abuse of process in CUPE, it is nonetheless consistent with the underlying 
principles enunciated by Justice Arbour. 
Although Justice Arbour emphasized that efficiency and finality are central to the 
integrity of the justice system, her judgment should not be read as an indication that 
these values are permitted to compromise the accuracy of the results. Indeed, her state-
ment that fairness may necessitate relitigation is recognition that efficiency should not 
trump truth-finding. As examples of fairness concerns that indicate the need for relitiga-
tion, she cited “an inadequate incentive to defend [the previous proceeding], the 
discovery of new evidence in appropriate circumstances, or a tainted original process.”89 
The common thread linking these examples is that they are all situations in which the 
verdict of the prior court is suspect, either because the process itself was compromised 
or because the previous court did not hear evidence that may shed a different light on 
the facts.  
These are the same concerns that are raised by plea bargaining. In situations involv-
ing plea bargains, there is no independent adjudication of facts by the criminal court. 
There is not a comprehensive presentation of evidence, and the court never rules on the 
viability of potential defences to the charges. Moreover, the inducements involved in 
plea bargaining are so strong that in some cases, they rise to the level of coercion and 
cast doubt on the reliability of the confession and its underlying facts. Therefore, allow-
ing rebuttal evidence to be adduced when a civil court determines that these dangers are 
present is in keeping with the principles underlying CUPE’s approach to abuse of pro-
cess. While allowing rebuttal evidence in these cases may raise some concerns, as 
discussed later in this section, this approach is preferable to the unfairness that has 
resulted from CUPE’s near-total bar on relitigation. 
Treating plea bargains as a fairness concern and permitting rebuttal evidence in ap-
propriate cases is also consistent with Justice Arbour’s concerns about relitigation. In 
CUPE, Justice Arbour outlined three ways in which relitigation may undermine the 
integrity of the justice system: (i) there is no guarantee that relitigation will yield a more 
accurate result; (ii) if the same result is reached in the subsequent proceeding, it will 
have been a waste of judicial resources; and (iii) if a different result is reached in the 
subsequent proceeding, the inconsistent verdicts undermine the credibility of the judi-
cial process.90 Yet in cases involving convictions based on plea bargains, these concerns 
are eliminated or significantly mitigated.  
First, allowing a convicted party to introduce evidence to rebut a conviction result-
ing from a plea bargain in appropriate cases would yield a more accurate result. Unlike 
convictions following trial, there has not been a full examination of the evidence when a 
conviction arises out of a plea bargain. The lack of adjudication of the facts coupled 
with the pressures involved in plea bargains means that there is a risk of untrustworthy 
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convictions. By allowing judges to examine these circumstances and permit rebuttal 
evidence only in cases in which a plea bargain has led to a questionable result, it allows 
civil courts to reach more accurate results.  
Second, if the same result is reached in the subsequent proceeding, there is not a 
significant waste of judicial resources. Granted, an inquiry into the circumstances of the 
plea bargain would introduce inefficiencies into the civil justice system. However, prior 
to CUPE, virtually all convictions were open to relitigation and the courts were capable 
of handling this extra burden. Permitting a brief inquiry into the circumstances sur-
rounding convictions only when they arise out of guilty pleas therefore does not create 
an unprecedented delay in the civil courts; moreover, the number of cases in which 
relitigation would actually be permitted would be even smaller. Even if this process does 
not change the outcome, examining the plea bargain and permitting rebuttal evidence in 
appropriate circumstances provides some assurance that civil liability will not be based 
on a wrongful conviction—a result that can only enhance the integrity of the justice 
system. 
Finally, any inconsistency between a criminal conviction based on a plea bargain 
and the decision of a civil court does not undermine the integrity of the justice system. 
As mentioned, unlike convictions following trial, a conviction based on a plea bargain 
does not involve a full adjudication of the facts; rather, the criminal defendant has re-
leased the Crown from its obligation to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If a civil 
court subsequently decides that a party who previously accepted a plea bargain is not 
guilty or that a fact underlying the conviction is inaccurate, it is therefore not contradict-
ing the finding of a criminal court in the same way as if the prior court had conducted a 
trial, made findings of fact after hearing a full presentation of the evidence, and found 
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  
B. A Framework for Permitting the Relitigation of Convictions based on Plea 
Bargains 
As discussed above, treating plea bargains as a fairness concern is reconcilable with 
the CUPE judgment. Given this conclusion, how might a civil court judge determine if 
a particular plea bargain raises fairness concerns that merit relitigation? To make this 
determination, the judge ought to inquire into whether the dangers of plea bargaining 
potentially influenced the result. Factors relating to the nature of the plea bargain itself 
and to the convicted party’s personal circumstances may help the judge obtain a more 
accurate picture of why the plea bargain occurred. Factors that may be important to 
consider in this analysis are:  
(i) The immediate effect of the plea bargain on the defendant’s liberty. 
For example, was the defendant being held in pre-trial custody and 
was he or she released as a result of a plea bargain? If so, this factor 
may indicate that there was a strong inducement to plead guilty. 
(ii) Personal factors and surrounding circumstances that may create an 
added inducement for the defendant to plead guilty. For example, a 
lack of financial resources, as in Andreadis, or a risk to the defendant’s 
livelihood, as in CPA, may explain why the defendant pleaded guilty. 
Similarly, if the defendant is the sole guardian or caretaker for his de-
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pendants and accepting the plea bargain allowed him to retain custo-
dy and return home, this may have provided a stronger inducement 
to plead guilty.  
(iii) The sentence the Crown originally sought as compared to the sen-
tence offered as part of the plea bargain. 
(iv) The charge(s) the defendant was originally facing and the charge(s) to 
which he or she ultimately pleaded guilty. 
(v) If the convicted party seeks to argue that he or she is not guilty, or 
merely seeks to dispute certain facts underlying the guilty plea. 
The judge should examine these factors in order to understand the circumstances 
surrounding the plea bargain and ascertain whether the resulting conviction is trustwor-
thy. In this respect, factors (i) and (ii) are the most important because they shed light on 
the particular situation of the accused and are most likely to reveal whether the terms of 
the plea bargain were so enticing that it verged on coercion. Factors (iii) and (iv) on 
their own will not suggest whether the plea bargain was coercive, but viewed in the 
context of the first two factors, they allow the judge in the civil action to determine the 
strength of the inducement given the accused’s personal circumstances.  
The fifth factor reflects the reality that a defendant may admit to a fact that is un-
true if it seems unimportant. Generally, an innocent defendant will only plead guilty if 
there is an overwhelming reason to do so, but the same level of pressure is not neces-
sary to produce untrue factual admissions. Indeed, criminal charges can require 
admissions of fact that are seemingly unimportant until one is before a civil court. For 
example, in CPA, Detective Madison was likely unaware of the importance of the off-
duty provision in the offence to which he pleaded guilty, but it turned out to be deter-
minative of whether he would obtain indemnification. Courts should more willingly 
permit convicted parties to contest a fact underlying their convictions simply because, as 
part of the plea negotiation process, a defendant may make seemingly unimportant 
factual concessions more readily. 
As part of the inquiry into these five factors, the convicted party should be required 
to indicate the nature of the evidence he or she hopes to introduce to cast doubt on the 
prior conviction or its underlying facts. If a convicted party does not refer to any evi-
dence casting doubt on the conviction, relitigation should not be permitted. However, if 
there is evidence to support the convicted party’s contention, the judge should consider 
this evidence generously and with regard to the potentially coercive nature of plea bar-
gaining. The ultimate decision about whether to allow relitigation must be based on an 
assessment of all of the circumstances surrounding the plea bargain. If there is a ques-
tion about the accuracy of the conviction or the underlying facts, rebuttal evidence 
should be permitted.  
C. Potential Concerns about Relitigating Convictions based on Plea Bargains 
This case-by-case analysis of the circumstances surrounding a plea bargain prevents 
unreliable convictions and factual concessions from tainting civil actions. That said, I 
acknowledge that this approach may raise concerns of its own, in that it slightly shifts 
the balance among the goals of finality, efficiency, and fairness. As the primary aim of 
this paper has been to examine how plea bargaining has come to affect our civil justice 
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system and to propose a potential solution, a detailed discussion of these concerns must 
be left for another day. That said, a few preliminary thoughts on some of the more 
obvious objections are in order. 
First, it must be emphasized that convictions remain evidence of great weight: liti-
gants should not have an open invitation to relitigation. By permitting relitigation only 
in cases in which a judge determines that a plea bargain resulted in an untrustworthy 
conviction, courts can address the fairness concerns that arise out of plea bargains while 
still preserving the goals of finality and efficiency.  
This approach also minimizes the concern that someone who is truly guilty will be 
able to take advantage of the system in order to escape civil liability, as was the case 
under Hollington. Rather, he or she must first show that the circumstances surrounding 
the guilty plea were inherently concerning. There will undoubtedly be situations in 
which someone who is guilty succeeds in doing so; however, this fact should not be 
troubling. The guilty are no less entitled to fair treatment in our court system than are 
the innocent. If anyone—guilty or innocent—has been coerced into a plea bargain and 
has thereby abandoned the right to a trial, permitting the civil courts to rely on the 
untrustworthy conviction compounds this unfairness. It can only enhance the reputa-
tion of our justice system to permit civil courts to allow relitigation when such 
circumstances are present.  
A potential objection to relaxing CUPE’s bar on rebuttal evidence is that permit-
ting relitigation might induce more people to plead guilty, knowing that they can relitigate 
their conviction in a subsequent civil trial. However, even if plea bargains are viewed as 
a fairness concern that permits relitigation, the approach set out above requires the 
convicted party to clear certain hurdles before the civil court will permit rebuttal evi-
dence. By requiring the judge to examine the circumstances surrounding the guilty plea 
and assess whether there is credible evidence that calls the result into question, relitiga-
tion is not a foregone conclusion. Moreover, even if relitigation is permitted, a 
conviction and a guilty plea should still be considered important evidence in coming to 
the final result. 
It could also be argued that precluding relitigation in subsequent proceedings 
would enhance accuracy at the plea bargaining stage. Under this theory, a decision to 
plead guilty would also take into account potential civil liability; in so doing, it would 
therefore discourage innocent defendants from pleading guilty. The problem with this 
line of reasoning is that in many cases, civil actions are not commenced until after the 
criminal action is complete. It is unreasonable to expect defendants to consider the 
hypothetical possibility of a civil action when faced with an immediate threat to their 
liberty. There is no feasible way for them to weigh the benefits and costs of a plea bar-
gain in this situation, and it is unrealistic to assume that they would do so.  
Conversely, if a civil action has already been commenced at the time of the plea 
bargain, this should be one of the “surrounding circumstances” the civil court judge 
considers when assessing whether relitigation should be permitted. If a criminal defend-
ant pleads guilty knowing that it may create civil liability in an existing proceeding, this is 
a factor that may suggest relitigation is not warranted (depending, of course, on other 
relevant surrounding circumstances).  
One might also argue that introducing an inquiry into the circumstances of the plea 
bargain and widening the scope for relitigation creates inefficiencies in the civil courts. 
While this may be true, our current system of precluding relitigation arguably leads to 
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greater inefficiency in the court system as a whole. Assuming defence lawyers are cor-
rectly advising their clients that they will not likely be able to contest a conviction based 
on a plea bargain in a subsequent civil case, our current system lessens the incentive to 
plead guilty. In so doing, our current approach to abuse of process may in fact be en-
couraging more criminal trials, creating a demand for resources that our criminal courts 
do not have. Plea bargaining is necessary to our criminal justice system, but sometimes 
creates unreliable results. A small delay in a subsequent civil proceeding in order to 
ensure that these convictions are trustworthy is an important counterbalance to this 
danger, particularly if our criminal justice system is unwilling or unable to address this 
problem.  
A related objection may be that these unreliable convictions could be avoided at 
the outset by simply requiring criminal courts to conduct a more robust plea inquiry. 
However, this solution would be unlikely to fix the problem. When a plea bargain is 
coercive, it is because the personal circumstances of defendants render the plea bargain 
impossible to resist, regardless of their guilt or innocence. If the inquiry included an 
examination of these inducements, defendants would likely downplay these incentives in 
order to convince the judge that the plea was voluntary and to obtain the benefit of the 
deal. As a result, a more detailed inquiry by the criminal courts into the inducements 
offered by a plea bargain would not likely correct the problem. 
While permitting rebuttal evidence when a judge determines that a plea bargain is 
untrustworthy widens the scope for relitigation, it does so in a limited sense. This ap-
proach recognizes that plea bargaining raises fairness concerns similar to those 
discussed in CUPE. Although relitigation should not be permitted in all cases involving 
plea bargains, permitting judges to inquire into the surrounding circumstances allows 
civil courts to strike a balance between fairness and efficiency that cannot be achieved if 
CUPE’s strict approach to abuse of process continues to apply to convictions arising 
out of guilty pleas.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
Plea bargaining is central to our criminal justice system and, as such, this practice is 
unlikely to disappear. Despite its importance in promoting efficiency, the inducements it 
offers can be so great that it may result in inaccurate factual admissions or, worse, false 
admissions of guilt. CUPE’s unprecedented restriction on relitigating prior convictions 
means that, for the first time, individuals whose convictions arose in doubtful circum-
stances may find themselves unable to question the propriety of their guilty plea in a 
subsequent civil action.  
Relaxing CUPE’s bar against rebuttal evidence in cases involving plea bargains is 
consistent with the situations Justice Arbour identified in which fairness may necessitate 
relitigation. Courts have not yet recognized that plea bargains on their own may create 
unfairness, perhaps because, historically, the presumption in favour of admitting rebut-
tal evidence rendered such a consideration unnecessary. Yet now that rebuttal evidence 
is generally precluded, it is time for our civil courts to recognize that convictions involv-
ing a plea bargain are not the same as convictions following trial. Convictions based on 
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plea bargains raise unique concerns that ought to be considered before civil courts rely 
on them to decide the outcome of a subsequent civil case. 
Recognizing the potential issues with plea bargaining and permitting rebuttal evi-
dence in appropriate cases is an important safeguard in order to ensure that an 
unreliable conviction does not taint the civil justice system. While this approach miti-
gates the problem that these unreliable convictions pose in the civil justice system, it 
may also have important implications for our criminal justice system. If civil courts’ 
inquiries into these convictions indicate that many of them are unreliable, it may indi-
cate that criminal defendants are paying too high a price for the efficient functioning of 
our criminal courts. Unless and until our criminal courts reform their approach to plea 
bargaining, a relaxation of CUPE’s bar on rebuttal evidence is an important—if margin-
al—corrective measure to prevent this unfairness from spilling over into our civil 
courts. 
